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The article deals with the development 
in the Russian-Estonian relations during 
the crises of 2007 and 2014, taking into 
consideration the balance between political 
and economic factors in the decision-ma-
king of the Estonian government. A number 
of special aspects, trends and problems in 
trade and investment ties are detected. 
The aim of the study is to uncover the 
key motivation behind the actions of both 
Russia and Estonia, to identify the drivers 
for economic and political development in 
the region, and to work out recommenda-
tions to adjust them. The questions put for-
ward by the authors of this article could not 
be more topical at the time, when Russia’s 
economic situation is obviously getting 
worse and capital flight (to the neighboring 
EU Member States) is likely to increase. 
The method of the study is a compara-
tive analysis of the impact on economic ties 
made by the Russian-Estonian crisis of 
2007 and the current international tension 
around Ukraine. The regional fossil fuel 
market and the possibilities of Gazprom in-
volvement in its development are also ana-
lyzed. 
It is concluded that political motives 
are still important for Estonia’s decision-
making, though they are balanced out by 
measures of business support (despite some 
of these measures being taken by the EU 
bodies). The role of political factor for the 
Russian side is increasing. It is acknowled-
ged that there is a growing number of mis-
sed economic opportunities in the Russian 
Northwest. 
 
Key words: Russia, Estonia, economic 
cooperation, trade balance, foreign direct 
investments, sanctions, competition among 
jurisdictions 
 
The crisis in the relations between 
Russia and western countries — pri-
marily, the EU member states — has 
accentuated a number of problems. Ma-
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ny of these problems existed earlier. However, they have become extremely 
acute only today. One of these ‘controversial issues’ is the balance between 
political considerations and international business interests1. Russian-Esto-
nian relations have always demonstrated this dualism. The current crisis em-
phasised it and gave it a new twist. 
 
 
 
Background 
 
Russia’s relations with the Baltic neighbours have never been easy or 
predictable demonstrating a lack of pragmatism and balance between politi-
cal emotions and economic interests. Estonia is Russia’s important economic 
partner due to objective geographical and infrastructure parameters (one of 
the few EU members sharing a long common border with the Russian Fede-
ration; the country has a seaport which is the closest to the EU and its infra-
structure is used to export Russian goods to the EU). However, in political 
and ideological terms, the country has proved to be an obstacle to a construc-
tive dialogue with western partners. The two parties make regular mutual 
accusations — Russia accuses Estonia of discrimination against the Russian-
speaking population, glorification of fascism, and a lack of respect for the 
memory of the fallen Soviet soldiers, whereas Estonia accuses Russia of de-
nying occupation, imperial ambitions, and meddling with the country’s do-
mestic affairs, etc. 
Nevertheless, the development of economic relations took its natural 
course: Russia was actively using Estonia’s transit capacities for exporting 
Russian goods to the EU and taking advantage of the investment opportuni-
ties. The economic cooperation was facilitated by both Estonia’s geographi-
cal position and long-standing cultural and social ties — approximately 25 % 
of Estonia’s population speaks Russian. In turn, Estonia sold its products 
(mostly those of the mechanical engineering and food industries) in the large 
Russian market, which became especially important after the country’s ac-
cession to the EU in 2004, which was associated with a steep increase in 
market competition and the need to comply with the rules of the EU’s com-
mon agricultural policy (fig. 1). 
It seems that the lack of a clear and comprehensive strategy for eco-
nomic cooperation demonstrated by both parties hampered the development 
of mutually beneficial and trust-based relations. Such relations could over-
weigh the lack of mutual political understanding in the periods of tension. 
This article analyses two crises in the Russian-Estonian relations that took 
place in the recent decade and the reaction they caused from both sides. 
 
                                                     
1 For more detail on the correlation between the economic and political factors in 
making foreign policy decisions, see [17—19]. 
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Fig. 1. Structure of Estonian exports to Russia in 2006, million euros 
 
Based on [1]. 
 
The 2007 crisis 
 
The 2007 events associated with the relocation of the memorial to Soviet 
soldiers to Tallinn’s outskirts were widely discussed in the Russian mass 
media. It became a litmus test for many processes taking place in Estonia. 
Attention was drawn to the correlation between the political and economic 
factors and the country’s policy in the international arena. 
The actions taken by the Estonian government significantly damaged the 
interests of business. The transit industry lost much in cargo — at the time, 
Estonia handled 25 % of Russia’s petroleum product exports to the EU. 
Other substantial transits included products of the coal, forest, chemical, and 
metallurgical industries. The irregularities in the Russian railways’ operation 
in Estonia, which followed the memorial relocation, complicated transit from 
the EU to Russia, which accounted for a significant proportion of the opera-
tion of Estonian transport infrastructure (railways, ports, and terminals). Ac-
cording to the national railway company of Estonia, the cargo tonnage de-
creased in January-March 2008 by 41 % as compared to the similar period of 
2007. Oil transportation dropped by 33 % and transit by 45 % [14]. As a re-
sult, approximately 10 transit companies stopped their operations and 200 
employees were laid off. 
In general, the losses sustained by the country’s economy reached 8 mil-
lion krooni (0.5 billion euros) per year, which accounts for approximately 
3 % of the country’s GDP. Moreover, the one-time losses in the post-crisis 
period were catastrophic for a number of industries. Experts estimate these 
losses at 320 million euros without taking into account profit and mid-term 
losses [20]. Bilateral trade was also affected (fig. 2). 
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Q 
Fig. 2. Estonian-Russian trade in 2000—2014, million euros 
 
Based on [1]. 
 
Russia launched projects aimed to transfer business activities from the 
Estonian to Russian border areas. The construction of a cutting-edge termi-
nal in the port of Ust-Luga received a boost; a comprehensive programme for 
the development of Russian ports in the Baltic was adopted in that period. 
For Estonia, another sensitive consequence of the political conflict was 
the mass exodus of Russian companies and investors and their re-orientation 
to the neighbouring countries and Russian border areas. The first companies 
to leave the country were transit businesses providing logistics and infra-
structure-related services — the Estonian Oil Service AS oil transhipment 
terminal, which handled around a quarter of the Russian fuel oil export to the 
EU, was sold by its owner Severstaltrans. The company froze other Estonian 
projects with the largest being the construction of a car manufacturing facility2. 
Large companies operating in different fields were also guided by the 
logic of politics: the Akron Chemical Holding abandoned a number of in-
vestment plans in Estonia, whereas VTB Kapital sold its stake in a local real 
estate development company. 
Despite the fact that the economic effect of the conflict was much more 
tangible for Estonia than Russia, Russian companies were also faced with a 
number of problems relating to the need to reroute transit. The Russian Baltic 
ports, including Saint Petersburg, were not ready to handle the required ton-
nage, which resulted in considerable time and reputation losses for businesses. 
                                                     
2 At the time, such investments aimed to avoid paying the EU’s high import duties 
for finished goods were very popular among Russian companies striving to penetrate 
the EU market. A company abandoning such project meant the primacy of politics 
over economy in operations in this region.  
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However, the greatest losses were sustained by Estonian businesses. The 
pressure exerted by business circles on Estonian authorities over the following 
years cooled the latter down and made them tackle certain political and im-
age-related issues more rationally. This affected both the further interaction 
between the two countries and Estonia’s behaviour during the current Uk-
raine crisis, which is also politically driven to a great degree. 
 
Cooperation in 2007—2014 
 
The post-crisis period in Russian-Estonian relations was characterised by 
a sporadic increase in trade and economic cooperation, which was inter-
rupted first by the 2008 world economic crisis and the 2014 Ukraine political 
conflict. Fluctuations in the bilateral trade and investment reflect these 
changes. 
In terms of exports, Russia is Estonia’s third largest trade partner: the 
country accounts for 12.1 % of total exports; however, in terms of imports, 
Russia ranks sixth with 6.8 %. The trade structure has not changed signifi-
cantly over the past 20 years (fig. 3). 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. The structure of Russian-Estonian bilateral trade in 2013, million euros 
 
Based on [1]. 
 
Russian-Estonian investment ties developed much slower than in the pre-
crisis period: Russian businesses became less active due to political reasons, 
whereas Estonia was seriously affected by the 2008 crisis. The level of Esto-
nia’s investment in Russia, which was rather high in the early and mid-2000s, 
dramatically decreased. The proportions of bilateral foreign direct invest-
ment in the FDI stock remained insignificant (fig. 4 and table 1). 
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Fig. 4. Bilateral Russian and Estonian FDI in 2000—2014, million euros 
 
Based on [1]. 
 
Table 1 
 
Bilateral Estonian and Russian FDI stock in 2003—2014,% 
 
FDI 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Russian in 
Estonia 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 6 
Estonian in 
Russia 3 4 14 9 8 5 5 6 5 4 4 4 
 
Based on [1]. 
 
Most cooperation took place ‘beyond politics’ as interactions between 
small and medium enterprises. The attempts to intensify cooperation were 
made in the framework of Lake Peipsi Project, the Pskov-Livonia eurore-
gion, and the Narva-Ivangorod twin city project [4]. 
A serious obstacle to such cooperation is the absence of an agreement on 
the Russian-Estonian border. The signing was stalled in the 1990s by fun-
damental differences in the interpretation of the 1918 Treaty of Tartu, which 
is not recognised by Russia and is referred to in the preamble to the agree-
ment by the Estonian party [8, p. 140]. 
Shortly before the Ukraine crisis, a new version of the agreement was 
approved and signed, however, its ratification was stalled due to cooling re-
lations. 
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The absence of an agreement complicates business activities in the bor-
der areas, in particular fishing and navigation within Lake Peipsi, hinders the 
handling of transit goods, and makes it impossible to modernise border 
checkpoints — and thus to increase their operational capacity and the cargo 
traffic. The uncertainty of the border line and the atmosphere of mutual dis-
trust resulted in a number of widely discussed incidents in the border area3, 
which strengthened the idea on the either side of the border that the other 
country is an undesirable and even dangerous location for doing business. 
Today, the above mentioned cross-border cooperation projects exist mostly 
on paper. They are constantly faced with organisational complications; the 
legal framework remains poorly developed and their funding is sporadic [6, 
p. 50]. The efforts, characterised by relatively sustainable development, are 
the Lake Peipsi and Narva-Ivangorod projects. However, this has been 
proven [21, p. 128] to be a result of the support from EU institutions. 
 
 
The 2014 crisis and sanctions 
 
The new crisis of 2014 was another crucible for the bilateral relations 
and revealed new components of Estonia’s economic policy based on the 
country’s previous experience. The mistakes made by both parties also be-
came evident. 
The cooling of political relations first affected investment cooperation. 
As mentioned above, it experienced difficult times before the crisis. However 
in 2014, its scope, structure, and dynamics underwent significant changes. 
A significant imbalance between investment flows emerged: Estonia’s 
investment stopped with the exception of OU Ecomet Invest [16], whereas 
Russian investment was steadily increasing. 
In the heat of the political conflict, Russian businesses were imple-
menting investment projects, announcing plans to launch production fa-
cilities in Estonia (table 2), and contacting the Estonian-Russian Chamber 
of Businessmen, the Russian Embassy in Estonia, and other relevant bo-
dies asking for information support as to investment opportunities in the 
country. The key reason behind it was the aspiration to minimise the in-
creasing risks associated with conducting business in Russia against the 
background of the Ukraine crisis. These risks include the weakening rou-
ble, possible unfavourable changes in the political situation, and the ge-
neral economic instability. 
                                                     
3 For instance, the arrest of the Estonian security official Eston Kohver in September 
2014 at the Russian-Estonian border by FSB. The questions as to the lawfulness of 
the arrest and whose territory the Khover was detained on are still open to discus-
sion. Shortly after that, the Estonian police ‘responded’ with arresting two Russian 
fishers on the Narva River. The fishers were reportedly identified as former KGB 
officers. They were released after two months in custody.  
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Table 2 
 
Russian investment projects in Estonia in 2014 
 
Company Date Project Project stage 
STK Group OÜ (ow-
ned by A. Pruidze, 
G. Nabiulin, and  
P. Starchenko) 
November 2014 Oil refinery in the 
port of Sillamäe,  
75 million euros 
Waiting for the construc-
tion permit,  
1.5—2 years 
EmLak April 2014 — 
January 2015 
Paint and varnish ma-
nufacture, 3 million 
euros 
A factory has been ope-
ned in Narva 
Natura Siberica April 2014 Cosmetics manufac-
ture in Tallinn 
A plan was announced 
to obtain raw materials 
and manufacture goods 
in Estonia 
IST (A. Nesis) September 2014 Urea plant in the port 
of Sillamäe 
A plant to construct a 
plant was announced  
Real estate 
Lepidus Ltd 
(owned by  
D. Skvortsov) 
2014 De la Gardie shop-
ping centre building
Purchased 
DLT Capital 
(T. Tolstaya,  
V. Yakovlev) 
2014 Cinamon cinema
chain 
Purchased 
Star Investments  
(14 Russian inves-
tors) 
2014 Warehouse and of-
fice buildings of the 
Magnum Medical
company 
Purchased 
 
Based on [3; 7; 12; 13]. 
 
According to the members of the business community, the advantages of 
investment in Estonia include the location of infrastructure on the territory of 
the European Union in close vicinity to the Russian border, often in a special 
economic zone, the ease of starting and doing business, favourable tax regu-
lations, the opportunity to obtain a residence permit, and others. 
Another competitive advantage of Estonia as compared to the Russia’s 
North-West is a programme for attracting eastern investors, which was 
launched in 2014. Within this programme, any investor can obtain so-called 
e-residency and a temporary residence permit if they register their company 
in Estonia. However, as any other businessperson, they will be exempt from 
the corporate tax reinvested in the country’s economy. This initiative fol-
lowed the abandonment of a similar practice in Latvia, which had given the 
country a significant number of new residents. Estonia plans to ‘pull over’ 
most of potential Russian investors from Latvia thus attracting approxi-
mately 10 million e-residents, the country’s population being 1.3 million 
people [15]. 
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These examples show the efforts taken by the Estonian authorities to rec-
tify the mistakes made after the 2007 crisis, which adversely affected local 
businesses. In the current conflict, the opposition between the political and 
economic interests is not that pronounced — additional measures have been 
taken to protect the interests of businesses. 
However, the temptation to join the political game did not go unnoticed. 
This time, ordinary consumers, small businesses, and farmers were affected. 
This became especially pronounced as the ‘war of sanctions’ between Russia 
and Estonia broke out. The Estonian government was one of the most consis-
tent supporters of imposing sanctions against Russia — including economic 
ones. As a result of the Russian countersanctions, the Estonian economy lost 
0.4 % of GDP (75 million euros), whereas the indirect losses are estimated at 
twice that level by the Estonian Institute of Economic Research [11]. 
As mentioned above, Estonia has a positive trade balance with Russia. In 
June 2014, Russia accounted for 24 % of Estonia’s dairy, 9 % vegetable, and 
5.5 % meat exports. The food import ban made Estonian producers (first of 
all, those in the dairy industry) look for new markets. For many of them, this 
turned out to be a grave problem — some firms went out of business or sig-
nificantly reduced their output. As a result, around 2,000 people were laid 
off. According to a survey conducted by the Institute of Economic Research, 
31 % of companies were affected by sanctions, which led to a decrease in 
turnover and cost effectiveness [2]. 
In general, Estonia’s food exports to Russia reduced by more than 60 % 
over six months (August 2014 — February 2015). The trade balance, al-
though still positive, decreased by almost 50 % — from 664 to 334 million 
euros in 2014 [1]. 
Estonian politicians have a rather casual attitude to sanctions stressing 
that sanction-related losses are temporary and insignificant. However, ac-
cording to an unofficial forecast of the Estonian Ministry of Economy and 
Infrastructure, the full effect of sanctions will be visible only at the end of 
2015 — the transport and transit industries will have been affected by then 
[9]. It is worth stressing that, at the beginning of 2015, the Estonian com-
pany GoRail almost faced insolvency as a result of the weakening rouble and 
decreasing traffic of goods to Russia, which coincided with the increase in 
fuel excise in Estonia. 
The GoRail situation demonstrates another aspect of the policy of tigh-
tening the screws on Russia. A serious long-term consequence of the current 
crisis is a reduced number of Russian tourists coming to Estonia caused by 
the weakening rouble. The tourist industry is one of the crucial areas of Es-
tonia’s economy: in 2013, it contributed 13.6 % to the country’s GDP. Rus-
sians account for 16 % of all tourists, this proportion increasing during New 
Year and May holidays. In Estonia’s North-East, approximately 45 % of tou-
rists come from Russia. A reduction in the number of Russian tourists will 
become a serious test for Estonia’s tourist industry in the years to come. 
This situation shows that, again, a number of Estonian officials sacrifice 
the country’s economic interests to political ambitions. Probably, during the 
current crisis, this policy was chosen consciously in hope of attracting sup-
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port from the EU fund established to help farmers affected by the Russian 
embargo. However, the 400 million euro fund was not enough to compensate 
for even a small share of the sustained losses. Moreover, the fund’s mecha-
nism could not provide Finnish farmers with support when they needed it 
most — in the first months after the embargo was imposed. 
 
Energy cooperation 
 
The energy issue is one of the most sensitive in Russian-Estonian rela-
tions. The country — as well as Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia — 
imports 100 % of its gas from Russia. Gas does not account for a significant 
proportion of Estonia’s energy consumption (4—7 % over the past decade 
according to the Estonian statistics). However, its proportion is not decrea-
sing despite the statements made by some Estonian politicians expressing 
anti-Russian sentiments4. 
A good example is the incident that took place in the summer of 2014. 
The Minister of Economy and Infrastructure Urve Palo sent a rather indig-
nant open letter to the head of the Estonian distribution network operator EG 
Võrguteenus, S. Jefimov, asking for an explanation of how his company 
would sustain a stable gas supply if Russia stopped exporting gas to Estonia 
and other Baltic states dependent on Russian gas. It is worth stressing that, 
by the time, the Ministry of Economy and Infrastructure had already deve-
loped an action plan in case of an interruption in the gas supply from Russia. 
Large energy consumers (in particular, the company providing heating to 
Tallinn’s residential areas) had to operate on fuel oil. The rest of winter gas 
consumption needs could be met by the Latvian Inčukalns gas storage faci-
lity, which supplies not only Latvia, but also Russian border areas and the Ka-
liningrad region in the winter period. The latter serves as another argument 
against the alleged intentions of Russia to interrupt the gas supply to the Bal-
tics or resort to ‘gas blackmail’ to achieve the country’s political goals. 
The pretext, context, and the general tone of the mentioned letter, as well 
as a large number of factual errors and leaps in logic (a letter concerning gas 
supply stability should have been addressed to the management of a com-
pany engaged in gas purchasing and distribution rather than a network opera-
tor that owns pipes but not the gas running through them) demonstrate the 
irrationality and the self-contained feeling of imminent danger and instability 
coming from Russia, which is generated by the Estonian establishment. 
It is worth stressing that Estonian politicians not only target their radical 
rhetoric at the country’s population, but also call for the other EU members 
to act accordingly. First, it concerns the implementation of the Third Energy 
Package fervently supported by Estonia. In the past months, the Estonian 
strategy for implementing the Energy Package provision has drifted towards 
tightening the rules for the market players oriented to the Russian supplier — 
Gazprom. 
                                                     
4 In September 2014, President T. H. Ilves stated that Estonia plans to become com-
pletely independent from the Russian energy system by 2025 [10]. 
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Today, 37 % of Eesti Gaas — Estonia’s gas market operator — is owned 
by Gazprom. The same holds true for EG Võrguteenus providing services to 
the transmission networks of Eesti Gaas. At first, Estonia opted for the ‘soft’ 
variant of implementing the Energy Package provisions through establishing 
an independent gas or power transmission operator (a large company has the 
right to retain the ownership or management of gas distribution assets, howe-
ver, these activities are tightly controlled). Now, the country is shifting to the 
‘hard’ version — ownership unbundling (the networks are managed by an 
independent operator, whereas the joint stock cannot be owned by a compa-
ny supplying or importing gas). This strategy was launched in the beginning 
of 2015, when Elering purchased 51 % of EG Võrguteenus. At the same ti-
me, the company announced plans to buy out the stock of all other players — 
Latvia’s Itera (10 %) and Gazprom (37 %). It is very likely that Gazprom will 
withdraw from the joint stock of Estonia’s gas market operator Eesti Gaas. 
This solution is motivated by not only solidarity with the European col-
leagues and the aspiration to meet all the requirements of the Third Energy 
Package, but also a clear goal — to prevent the Russian gas monopoly from 
influencing the decisions concerning the development of the gas transmis-
sion infrastructure in the region. 
In this context, the situation is not favourable for the Baltics. Among the 
attempts at implementing infrastructure projects, one should mention the Es-
tonian-Finnish dispute about the right to construct a LNG terminal in one of 
the countries and the gas pipeline Balticconnector in the Gulf of Finland. 
These infrastructure facilities played an important role in interconnecting the 
gas transmission networks of Finland, the Baltics, and Poland with the rest 
of Europe. If they are implemented, Estonia will gain access to gas from the 
floating LNG facility in Klaipeda built in 2014 (this gas will cost much more 
than Russian). 
However, the dispute with Finland has not been settled. The European 
Commission considered building two terminals in both countries unreaso-
nable; therefore, funds will not be allocated in this round of financing. The 
stumbling stone is the small size of Estonia’s (and the Baltics’) domestic 
market and the inability to ensure stable demand for gas from the new gas 
storage facility. 
Therefore, Estonia does not seem to have a bargaining advantage in the 
forthcoming 2016 gas price negotiations with Gazprom. The prospect of 
constructing an LNG terminal in Estonia as an alternative gas source — if 
the project is supported — is rather distant. The possibility of interconnec-
ting with the Latvian gas storage facility and operating on fuel oil was enter-
tained before; however, they never served as a serious argument for drop-
ping gas prices. 
In general, the implementation of the Third Energy Package provisions 
facilitates competition between numerous regional infrastructure projects 
proposed by the Baltic and Nordic countries. However, due to the small size 
of their domestic markets, it results only in growing prices. The merging 
competition cannot be translated into consumer’s benefit or the weakening 
of Gazprom’s position. 
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*** 
Over the past decade, each crisis in the already strained Russian-
Estonian relations has urged the authorities on the either side to rectify mis-
takes. After the 2007 conflict, Estonian politicians started to pay more atten-
tion to protecting the interests of national large businesses when addressing 
political differences. The current crisis has shown pragmatism gradually re-
placing political emotions. However, miscalculated opportunities and mis-
placed expectations regarding the EU support did not prevent losses — ordi-
nary consumers, small businesses, and farmers were affected. 
As to Russia, the situation is developing differently. After the first con-
flict, it was decided to adapt business processes to the political situation. To 
this end (it is worth stressing that it will have a favourable effect on Russian 
business in a long-term perspective), the construction of the port of Ust-Luga, 
as well as other infrastructure objects on the Russian territory, was launched. 
However, the current crisis presents Russia with challenges that are more 
serious: the disproportion of FDI is already tangible and it will only grow in 
the months to come. Interested in the increase in Russian investment in the 
neighbouring country, the Russian authorities have to ensure that this in-
vestment is a mutually beneficial process rather than the exodus of capital 
accompanied by the transfer of production and infrastructure facilities 
abroad. In view of Estonia’s natural advantages (its geographical position, 
ethnic and language composition, and EU membership), it is worth keeping 
in mind the additional measures taken by the country’s leadership to increase 
its investment attractiveness — tax privileges, e-residency for investors, and 
others. Obviously, these measures and Russia’s ‘worsening’ economic outlook 
contribute to the competition of jurisdictions in the Russian North-West, and 
not to the country’s benefit. 
 
This article, prepared at the Institute of World Economy and Interna-
tional Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, was supported by a 
grant of the Russian Research Foundation (project No. 14-28-00097 ‘Opti-
misation of Russian foreign investment ties against the background of dete-
riorating relations with the EU’). 
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